contingent truths and necessary truths. Leibniz
On Leibniz 'Philosophical Writings (by Ezequiel Alonso, Charcas, 1980) Chapter V "First making the system "item 4" necessary and contingent truths "by Virginia Fernandez
Rationalist, nativist, the continuation of the current modern thinking with the head the name of Descartes, involved in reading the English empiricist, especially Locke believes that the mistake they make is trying to reduce the ratio to the pure fact, the factual, are wrong in considering the thought as pure experience.
Our knowledge, pose Leibniz, is composed of truths "right" and truth "in fact, be true" a statement whose predicate is included in the subject. "
truths of reason are those set out that something is so and can not be more than that way, are those that express a necessary being. Truths of fact are those set out that something is in some ways but it could be otherwise, are those that express a contingent being, are causal, accidental. The first group of truths we find the truths of mathematics and pure logic. In the second group are historical truths, the truths of physical experience.
What are the truths of reason are innate means so germ, which is a germ of these ideas in mind and is what is the spirit itself. Knowledge is included in the human mind. These germs, these innate ideas require only contact with the experience to unfold. These truths of reason, we can say that they are a priori, independent of experience. On the contrary, the truths are in fact produced by experience, are imprinted on us through perception.
As the ideal of knowledge, the necessary knowledge, which is supplied to us by the truths of reason, are these necessary truths facing the contingency of the others.
"An absolutely necessary proposition is one that can be solved in identical propositions, whose opposite implies contradiction." Thus
we found necessary truths expressing a need "metaphysical or geometrical, and continues Leibniz," to which no such need to call it contingent, but that implies a contradiction, that is, whose opposite is needed, is called impossible. Other things are called possible. "
contingent truths Still, the fact, no longer have a certain objectivity, because somehow, the way it is. Then we can see that there is a principle of "sufficient reason", a way to think of the endless series of possibilities that I have a proposition to the other and that makes me weary on the arduous path of not being able ever to identity, cause that does not require the application of the principle of sufficient reason, but it was a cause which possesses within itself the necessity. Should be a fact and a truth of reason. That is God for Leibniz. This is why it arises in us a knowledge that is ideal of pure rationality. The man with the accumulation of knowledge, the establishment of connections, by reasoning, combinations, substitutions, through logical judgments and rules set, so we could approach the divine knowledge, as an ideal of knowledge.
"We learn by this that some are propositions concerning the essences of things, others, however, the que concierne a sus existencias; las esenciales son, como es obvio, aquellas que pueden demostrarse por análisis de sus términos; es decir, las que son necesarias, o sea, las que son virtualmente idénticas; cuyo opuesto es, por lo mismo, imposible, o sea, virtualmente contradictorio. Y estas son las verdades eternas que no solo valdrán mientras el mundo subsista, sino que también habrían valido si Dios hubiese creado un mundo según otra norma. De estas difieren, empero, las existenciales o contingentes, cuya verdad es comprendida a priori por la sola mente infinita, y no puede demostrarse con análisis alguno; y tales son aquellas que son verdaderas en un tiempo determinado, y no solo expresan lo que pertenece a the possibility of things, but what now exists or what there was to be contingently, under certain conditions, for example, that I now live, the sun shines. "
As we find that God does nothing without knowing in advance what does, and the knowledge of necessary truths is involved in the divine intellect, Leibniz writes that contingent truths are "divine decrees." It is God who predetermines the ideas of men, before they exist. These contents of the mind, that power of representing a certain things, these ideas are going to be guided by the understanding of combination and substitution operations, whose passage from one idea to another is possible
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